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JOSEPH MATAL V. TAM 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017)
I. INTRODUCTION
Respondent Simon Tam, lead singer of the band "The
Slants," filed an application for trademark registration with the
United States Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO"). The
USPTO denied Tam's application under the disparagement clause
of the Lanham Act ("clause"),' a federal law which includes a
provision prohibiting registration of marks that may disparage
persons, living or dead.2 Tam challenged the decision before the
USPTO's Trademark Trial and Appeal Board ("TTAB") to no
avail.3
Following the TTAB's rejection of his appeal, Tam brought
suit in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
The government argued that registered trademarks represent
government speech, and that federal registration is auxiliary to the
government.4  An en banc court rejected the government's
arguments and found the disparagement clause of the Lanham Act
unconstitutional under the First Amendment.' The majority found
that the disparagement clause could not survive strict scrutiny.6 As
a result, the Federal Circuit held the clause "regulates the expressive
component" of trademarks, therefore prohibiting its application to
commercial speech.7
The government filed a petition for certiorari to the United
Tam's application was denied under a provision within the Lanham Act
referred to by the Court as the "disparagement clause." The relevant portion of
the Act prohibits registration of trademarks that "may disparage or falsely
suggest a connection with persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or
national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute." See generally
Matal v. Tam, 137 S.Ct. 1744, 1765 (2017); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1052 2(a).
2 15 U.S.C. §1052(a) (2006).
3 Tam, 137 S.Ct. at 1754.
4 See Id.
5Id.
6 Id.
7Id.
57
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States Supreme Court.8 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
determine if the disparagement provision was facially invalid under
the First Amendment. 9 In its holding, the Court indicated that the
provision violates a fundamental principle of the First Amendment
by prohibiting speech because it expresses offensive ideas.'o The
majority concluded that the provision was too broad; in its current
interpretation, the commercial market is replete with "merchandise
that disparages prominent figures and groups."' I
In Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion, he opined that
while the Court was correct in its judgment, a more searching review
was required.' 2 According to Justice Kennedy's opinion, the
disparagement clause represented the essence of viewpoint
discrimination because it allowed registration of a positive or benign
mark, but not a derogatory one.' 3 The Supreme Court affirmed the
Court of Appeal's judgment in favor of respondent Tam.1 4
H. BACKGROUND
Simon Tam is the lead singer of the band The Slants." He
chose the band's epithet in an effort to denature stereotypes
derogatory to Asian culture.1 6 Tam and fellow members of the
dance-rock band are Asian-Americans hoping to contradict
perception of the racial slur by incorporating it into pop culture.17 In
support of their efforts, the group titled their albums "Slanted Eyes,
Slanted Hearts" and "The Yellow Album," and incorporated lyrics
that "draw inspiration. . . from childhood slurs and mocking nursery
rhymes."' 8 The Slants began performing as a musical group using
8 Id. at 1755.
9 Tam, 137 S.Ct. at 1755.
'OId. at 1759.
" Id. at 1765.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 1766.
14 Id. at 1765.
15 Tam, 137 S.Ct at 1754.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 1751.
'8 Id. at 1754.
58
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the name in 2006.19
An examining attorney for the USPTO rejected Tam's
application for federal trademark registration of THE SLANTS on
the principal register in 2011.20 The examiner's review included
application of the USPTO's two-part disparagement test.2 1 After
applying this test to Tam's application, the examining attorney
found that a "substantial composite of persons" found the term
"offensive." 22 The examiner relied on dictionary definitions
depicting 'slant' or 'slant-eyes' as derogatory terms, as well as
bloggers and article commenters who indicated that they found the
term offensive. 23
The TTAB affirmed the examining attorney's finding
during Tam's appeal. 24 The panel found substantial evidence that
public perception of the term was predominately negative. 25
Evidence supporting this perception included the fact that Tam's
appearance at the 2009 Asian American Youth Conference in
Portland was cancelled due to concerns regarding interpretation of
the band's name.26
Following the TTAB's decision regarding Tam's appeal,
Tam filed suit in federal court.27 The United States Court of
a In Re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
20 Id.
21 Tam, 137 S.Ct. at 1754. The first step of the USPTO's two-part test considers
the likely meaning of the questioned matter by evaluating dictionary definitions,
the relationship of the matter to other elements in the mark, the nature of the
goods or services in question, and the manner in which the mark is used in the
marketplace. If that meaning is found to refer to "identifiable persons,
institutions, beliefs, or national symbols," the examiner enacts the second step
of the test. The second step considers whether a "substantial composite" of the
group in question may find the meaning disparaging. If the examiner finds that
substantial composite would find the proposed mark disparaging, the burden
shifts to the applicant to prove the meaning is not disparaging.
22 Id. 1754.
23 Id.
24 In Re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1332.
25 Id.
26 id.
27 Tam, 137 S.Ct. at 1755.
2017] 59
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Appeals for the Federal Circuit ruled that the disparagement clause
used by both the USPTO and the TTAB to deny Tam's application
was facially invalid under the First Amendment.2 8 The court
indicated that the clause promoted viewpoint-based discrimination
by regulating the expressive component of trademarks.2 9 This
holding determined that trademarks under the disparagement clause
could not be treated as commercial speech, disproving the
government's assertions that under such cases, intermediate
scrutiny was the appropriate determination. 30 The majority held that
the clause would fail analysis under the Court's commercial speech
cases, even under intermediate scrutiny.31
The government petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari
in 2016.32 The Supreme Court granted the order to determine
whether the disparagement clause was facially invalid under the
First Amendment.3 3
IHI. LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME COURT'S
OPINION
The Supreme Court held the disparagement clause
unconstitutional, but could not reach unanimous reasoning. Justices
Alito, Kennedy and Thomas delivered opinions concurring in parts
and concurring in judgment.3 4 To determine whether the clause
violated the First Amendment, the Court considered the
government's contentions that trademarks are examples of
government speech, not free speech; trademarks are forms of
government subsidy; and a new "government-program" doctrine
should determine the constitutionality of the disparagement
clause. 35
28 Id.
29 Id. at 1754.
30 Id. at 1754-55.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 1754.
33 Tam, 137 S.Ct. at 1755.
34 Id. at 1751; Id. at 1765.
35 Id. at 1757.
60
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A. The Government's Arguments
Before addressing the government's arguments, Justice
Alito noted Tam's argument that the disparagement clause does not
reach marks disparaging racial or ethnic groups.3 6 Justice Alito
explained that it was not granted certiorari because the argument
was not raised before either the USPTO or the Federal Circuit.3 7
Tam asserted that the clause challenged the definition of the term
"persons." 3 8 He claimed the definition of "persons" included
"natural and juristic person" and not "non-juristic entities such as
racial and ethnic groups."3 9 The Court found Tam's reading of the
term too narrow.4 To reach this conclusion, the Court looked to the
language of the clause itself, which indicated "persons" plural, not
"person" singular, as evidence that Tam's interpretation did not
encompass the breadth of the disparagement clause.4 1
After discussing Tam's interpretation of the disparagement
clause, the Court considered the government's argument that
trademarks constitute government speech.42 Justice Alito's opinion
noted that trademarks have not historically been used to express a
government message, nor has evidence indicated that the public
associates trademark messages with the government.43 The Court
held that trademarks are private speech, not government speech.44
The government's argument that trademarks are government
subsidies conveying a specific viewpoint was also rejected. 45 After
evaluating supporting case law, the Court distinguished the present
case by emphasizing that, unlike those instances, the USPTO does
not extend monetary compensation to trademark registration
36 Id. at 1755.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Tam, 137 S.Ct. at 1755.
40 Id. at 1756.
41 See Id.
42 Id. at 1757-1758.
43 Id. at 1759.
44 Id. at 1760.
45 Tam, 137 S.Ct. at 1761.
2017] 61
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applicants.4 6 This distinction drew a clear line of demarcation
because "government service requires the expenditure of
government funds."4 7
Finally, the Court addressed the government's argument that
the disparagement clause could be sustained under a "government-
program" doctrine. 48 The government supported this argument with
case law upholding restriction of speech based on the content of
such speech. 4 9 The Court drew a distinction between these cases
and Tam's trademark application. Specifically, the Court indicated
that some content- and speaker-based restrictions may be allowed,
but even in cases condoning those restrictions, "viewpoint
discrimination" is prohibited.50 Broadly speaking, because the
disparagement clause applies evenhandedly to all types of groups,
the clause discriminates on the basis of viewpoint. ' The Court
stated that denial of a mark, based on its potential to offend
necessarily represents viewpoint discrimination; in essence, offense
is a viewpoint.5 2
After determining the government's arguments
unpersuasive, the Court evaluated a debate between the parties. 53
The debate focused on whether trademarks, if considered
commercial speech, should be subject to more relaxed scrutiny.5 4
46 Id. at 1761. The government relied on Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991)
(holding that federal law that funded private parties for their family planning
was a government subsidy); National Endowment for Arts v. Finely, 524 U.S.
569 (1998) (holding that artists who received cash grants were receiving
government subsidies); and United States v. American Library Assn., Inc., 539
U.S. 194 (2003) (holding federal funding for public libraries was government
subsidy).
47 Tam, 137 S.Ct. at 1761.
48 Id. at 1763.
49 Id. at 1761-62. The Court acknowledged that these cases occupied a special
areas of First Amendment law that is far removed from the registration of
trademarks.
50 Id. at 1763.
51 Id. at 1763.
52 Id.
53 Tam, 137 S.Ct. at 1763.
54 Id. at 1763.
62
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The government argued that trademarks are commercial speech,
while Tam looked to the expressive content of trademarks to refute
the government's claim." Tam asserted that trademarks do not only
identify a source of a product or service.5 6 Instead, trademarks
extend further into representation - in his case, THE SLANTS is not
simply a band name, but an expression of social views.5 7 The Court
found the government's contention too broad, and pointed to the
presence of merchandise that disparages groups, figures, and
individuals as an indication of such.' Allowing a commercial label
to suppress speech of political or social nature would endanger free
speech.59 Applying this analysis, the Court declined the
government's argument.60
B. Content v. Viewpoint Discrimination
Justice Kennedy, concurring, expressed that a more
searching exploration of First Amendment rotections of viewpoint
discrimination to trademarks was required. He stated that content-
based discrimination includes speech suppression aimed at
particular subject matter, with a subcategory attempting to suppress
particular views on a subject. 62  That subcategory, viewpoint
discrimination, is an abhorrent form of content discrimination. 6 3
The test used to determine viewpoint discrimination considers
whether the government has isolated messages for disapproval
based on its expressed views. 64 In the instant case, the government
identified the subject as "persons," creating an isolated group
subject to evaluation under the disparagement clause. 65 According
5 Id. at 1764.
56 Id.
5 Id.
58 Id. at 1765.
59 Tam, 137 S.Ct. at 1765.
60 Id.
61 id.
62 Id. at 1765-1766.
63 Id. at 1766.
6 Id.
65 Tam, 137 S.Ct. at 1766.
2017] 63
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to the disparagement clause, an applicant can register a positive
mark within that subject, but not a derogatory or disparaging one.6 6
The Court found the government's disfavoring of a category of
messages to be the intrinsic definition of viewpoint discrimination.67
Justice Kennedy's conclusion refuted the government's
arguments. First, the government asserted that the law was
viewpoint-neutral because it applied equally to all trademarks. 6 8
The Court reasoned that this perspective allowed laws to be
viewpoint neutral if they praised, but not if they condemned.6 9
However, the Court indicated that the First Amendment protects
more than identification with a specific side.70  The First
Amendment allows arguments for "particular positions in particular
ways."7 1 Second, the government argued the disparagement clause
is viewpoint-neutral because it concerns trademarks generally,
regardless of an applicant's choice of mark or personal views. 7 2 The
government explained that Tam's application was not rejected
based on a belief that Tam intended to offend, rather because of the
government's concerns that it would be offensive to some Asian-
Americans.73 The Court did not allow insulation of a law from
charges of viewpoint discrimination based on censorship simply
because of an audience's potential reaction.74 Allowing such
insulation would remove the potential for a positive expression in
instances such as Tam's, where reclaiming the term would stimulate
celebration of our diverse nation. Concluding this idea, the Court
explained that the public deserved the opportunity to learn from the
trademark's message, regardless of the government's negative
perception.76
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id
70 Id.
7 Tam, 137 S.Ct. at 1766.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 1767.
75 Id.
76 Id.
8
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 28, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 4
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol28/iss1/4
MATAL V TAM
In consideration of the parties' commercial speech debate,
Kennedy's opinion indicated the issue was resolved when such
speech was determined viewpoint discrimination.7 7 Trademarks,
when qualifying as commercial speech, are not exempted from the
First Amendment's requirement of viewpoint neutrality.7 8 Marks
exist in a tangible marketplace replete with messages expressing a
multitude of everyday expressions ranging from political
organizations to entertainment networks. 7 9  Allowing viewpoint
discrimination in such context would be to allow government
censorship.80 Kennedy concluded his opinion by asserting that a
law prohibiting offensive speech defies the First Amendment by
permitting government benevolence.8 1
Justice Thomas wrote briefly, to express his belief that strict
scrutiny is required when the government restricts speech in order
to suppress the ideas it conveys.8 2 According to Justice Thomas,
this applies regardless of whether the speech is categorized as
commercial speech.
IV. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
The significance of the Matal v. Tam decision rests in its
unique position of evaluating a trademark issue under constitutional
analysis. 84 In previous intellectual property cases considering First
Amendment scrutiny, the United States Supreme Court determined
that U.S. copyright laws were constitutional so long as traditional
11 Tam, 137 S.Ct. at1767
78 Id.
79 Id. at 1768.
80 d
81 Id. at 1769.
82 Id
83 Tam, 137 S.Ct. at 1769.
84 Lisa Ramsey, Symposium: Increasing First Amendment scrutiny of trademark
law after Matal v. Tam, SCOTUSBLOG (Jun. 20, 2017, 2:33 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/06/symposium-increasing-first-amendment-
scrutiny-trademark-law-matal-v-tam/.
2017] 65
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protections remained unaltered by Congress.15 Despite copyright
considerations, the Court had not considered trademark
constitutionality. 86
Prior to Tam, the disparagement clause had been upheld in
Federal Court.87 In Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed an appeal
by the owner of the Washington Redskins after the TTAB cancelled
the team's trademark registration under the disparagement clause.88
The Federal Court indicated that the mark THE REDSKINS may
dishonor Native American groups,89 and held the disparagement
clause was not facially void for vagueness under Due Process
principles, nor vague as applied.9 0
Prior to the Supreme Court's holding in Tam, the Federal
Court in Pro-Football also determined that trademark expressions
did not constitute commercial speech.9 1 Following denial of the
appeal, the plaintiff in Pro-Football filed a petition for review with
the Supreme Court.92 The Supreme Court subsequently denied
certiorari. 93 After announcement of the decision in Tam, the
attorney for the Washington Redskins stated "the Supreme Court
vindicated the Team's position that the First Amendment blocks the
government from denying or cancelling a trademark registration
8 Id. With respect to copyright constitutionality, the Supreme Court has
considered Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S.Ct. 769, 770 (2003) (holding that
plaintiff s First Amendment rights were not violated under the Copyright Term
Extension Act, and that their use of previously copyrighted acts that had fallen
out of protection, but regained protection through the Act, was improper use);
See Golan v. Holder, 132 S.Ct. 873 (2012) (holding that the First Amendment
did not inhibit restoration authorized under the Uruguay Round Agreements
Act, which granted protection for certain preexisting works that were
copyrighted in the work's country of origin, but not in the United States).
86 Id.
87 See Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F.Supp.3d 439 (E.D.Va. 2015).
88 Id. at 450,
89 Id. at 447.
90 Id. at 452.
9 1 Id. at 457.
92 Pro-Football, Inc. V. Blackhorse, 137 S.Ct. 44 (2016) (Cert. denied.).
93 Id.
66
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based on the government's opinion." 94
While the Court's decision in Tam broadens the
acceptability scope of marks previously condemned as disparaging,
it is significant to note Tam's assertion that his choice of band name
was meant to embrace a contemptuous term directed at a class of
which Tam himself was a member. To the contrary, the Washington
Redskins are not typically comprised of Native Americans seeking
to embrace a derogatory term in effort to change its meaning. This
is a key distinction between the two. By modem standards, it is
undeniable that the name "Redskins" is decidedly meant to insult a
group not represented by those seeking trademark approval of the
term. The statement by the Redskins' attorney disregards the
dissimilarity between the team's composition and that of The Slants,
and appears to embrace trademark registration as freely accessible
in light of the decision in Tam, regardless of the intention behind the
application for registration. Should USPTO respond accordingly,
Tam may have broadened the opening for registration of trademarks
that are intended to disparage. The wake of Tam begs a simple
question - how far is too far?
While no further action has been taken to date on behalf of
the Washington Redskins, 95 others have taken the Tam decision as
an opportunity to pursue what previously had been prevented. 96 The
day following issuance of the decision, eleven applications for
marks that could be perceived as offensive or disparaging were
filed.97 These applications currently await review by the USPTO.98
There is little doubt that additional filings will follow suit as the
public attempts to determine the new standard in disparaging
94 Lake Lewis, TWITTER (Jun. 19, 2017, 10:46am),
https://deadspin.com/supreme-court-strikes-down-provision-that-would-have-
ba-1796223919.
" Pro-Football, Inc., 137 S.Ct. at 44 (Cert. denied.).
96 Tim Lince, Numerous 'Offensive' Trademark Applications Filed Following
Tam Ruling; Applicants Reveal Commercial Hopes and Exploitation Fears,
WORLD TRADEMARK REVIEW (Jun 26, 2017),
http://www.worldtrademarkreview.com/Blog/detail.aspx?g-5f074f89-Of55-
4af4-934 1 -e605facc7776.
9 7 id.
98 See Id.
2017] 67
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trademark acceptability.
Consideration must be also given to the remaining language
of Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act. Portions of the provision other
than the disparagement clause have been questioned, including
clauses prohibiting registration of immoral and scandalous marks.99
Currently, a case pending before the Federal Circuit challenging the
constitutionality of the scandalousness provision, which prohibits
marks deemed "immoral, deceptive or scandalous,"'o awaits
review following the ruling in Tam.'' There, the petitioner seeks
review of denial of his application for protection of his mark,
"FUCT" for certain apparel.10 2 Though represented merely as a
brand name, the inference to an often used slang term is apparent in
the pronunciation. Pending resolution of litigation in this case, the
USPTO has suspended review of trademark applications that may
lie within the scope of the scandalousness provision.'0 3 The Federal
Circuit has requested the parties involved in the case submit
supplemental briefs regardin resolution of the scandalousness
provision's constitutionality.' 0
Though constitutional distinctions could be drawn between
portions of the provision, it seems unlikely given the rationale in
Tam, that the Supreme Court would choose to bifurcate the
language. Acceptance of trademarks that would not achieve
" Monica Riva Talley, Bring On The Bad Word Brands?, NATIONAL LAW
REvIEW (July 3, 2017), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/bring-bad-word-
brands-what-supreme-court-s-decision-matal-v-tam-means-trademark.
oo 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2)(a) (2012).
10' Talley, supra Note 9.
102 Louis S. Ederer, Roberta L. Horton, Paul C. Llewellyn, Kyle D. Gooch,
Supreme Court Strikes Down 70-Year Old Statutory Provision Barring the
Registration of "Disparaging" Trademarks, ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE
SCHOLER (June 21, 2017),
https://www.apks.com/en/perspectives/publications/2017/06/supreme-court-
strikes-down-70yearold-statutory.
103 U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Examination Guidance for Section 2(a) 's
Disparagement Provision after Matal v. Tam and Examination for Compliance
with Section 2(a) 's Scandalousness Provision While Constitutionality Remains
in Question (2017), Examination Guide 1-17.
104 Ederer, supra Note 102.
68
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approval in the current climate due to their vulgar or scandalous
nature could be perceived as a natural progression of our ever-
evolving culture, or evidence of the fluidity of language.
Throughout society's evolution, language has adapted with the
invention of new terminology or interpretation of common
vocabulary. Perhaps, under the constitutional scrutiny that
discharged the disparagement clause, the scandalousness provision
will reach the same fate. The establishment of new thresholds for
trademark registration acceptance could continue to broaden
utilization of language.
V. CONCLUSION
After review of the government's arguments in favor of
upholding the disparagement clause, the Supreme Court found that
by prohibiting offensive speech, the provision violated the First
Amendment."os This decision broadens review for future trademark
registration cases, and sets precedent for additional constitutional
challenges to language within the Lanham Act. With that in mind,
though the constitutionality of the disparagement clause has not
survived the Court's scrutiny, the consequential breadth of its
demise remains uncertain. This controversy teeters on interpretation
of Tam as either simple and clear rationale, or having the potential
to unravel a history of increased protections afforded to persons and
groups who have suffered. The future of trademark registration,
following Matal v. Tam, will continue to attempt achievement of
that the tenuous balance.
Elly Goettelman*
105 Matal v. Tam, 137 S.Ct. 1744, 1765 (2017).
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